Summary. -We examine the allocation of net loans, net transfers, and grants to IDA countries over the period 1982-2008 focusing on 7 the role of debt and debt sustainability in the decisions of multilateral and bilateral donors. We find no evidence of defensive lending but 8 strong evidence of defensive granting. A significant negative reaction of net loans to the debt ratio indeed characterizes the decisions of 9 both multilateral and bilateral creditors. The impact of lower loans on the budget of debtor countries is however accommodated through 10 higher grants, in addition to debt relief. These findings are consistent with a substitution of grants for loans and with the new approach 11 to debt sustainability but question the efficiency and selectivity of foreign aid. besides geopolitical motivations, is one of the reasons that 36 may explain the past allocation of foreign aid. In particular, 37 it can be argued that, in the past, loans and grants were direc-38 ted to highly indebted countries with the aim to avoid their de-39 fault. The role of debt in explaining a nonselective pattern of 40 aid flows has been scantly investigated in the literature on 41 aid selectivity, and informally discussed in the literature on 42 defensive lending (Bird & Milne, 2003; Birdsall, Claessens, & 43 Diwan, 2003; Cohen, Jacquet, & Reisen, 2007; Easterly, 44 2002; Lerrick, 2005) . In this paper we explicitly examine the 45 role of debt (and its ownership) in affecting official donors' 46 decisions on allocating aid to low income countries. 47
. In this paper we explicitly examine the 45 role of debt (and its ownership) in affecting official donors' 46 decisions on allocating aid to low income countries. 47 Relying on Bohn's (1998) model of intertemporal debt sus-48 tainability, we first derive theoretical implications for net loans 49 and net transfers (net of debt service) in relation to external 50 debt that imply no-Ponzi scheme financing and trade-deficit 51 correction, respectively. We show that a negative reaction of 52 net loans to the debt ratio is a sufficient condition for a sus-53 tainable (no-Ponzi) debt strategy, whereas positive or no reac-54 tion would be evidence of defensive lending. Furthermore, 55 since net transfers should decrease with the debt ratio to force 56 a correction of the trade deficit (or greater FDI inflows), the 57 relation between net transfers and debt allows us to investigate 58 whether debtor countries' policies were "constrained" by for-59 eign aid. Further insight is obtained by studying the allocation 60 of grants excluding debt relief. A positive reaction of conven-61 tional grants to the debt ratio together with a reduction of net 62 loans suggests that grants, in addition to debt relief, were given 63 to ease the debt reduction process in highly indebted countries. 64 We call this strategy "defensive granting," for lack of a better 65 term. 66 We estimate separate dynamic models of the allocation of 67 net loans, grants, and net transfers with panel data for 75 68 International Development Association (IDA) and IDA-69 Blend countries (hereafter IDA countries) over the period 70 from 1982 to 2008, using both fixed-effects GLS and difference 71 GMM estimators. 3 
72
We find no evidence of defensive lending. Indeed, a signifi-73 cant negative reaction of net loans to the debt ratio character-74 izes the decisions of both multilateral and bilateral creditors. 75 Furthermore, each creditor group shows a stronger reaction 76 to the debt share it holds than to the share of debt held by 77 the other group. This finding is consistent with the creditors' 78 aim to reduce loans where they were more exposed, which is 79 in contrast with a defensive strategy. On the other hand, we 80 cannot reject the hypothesis that net transfers were insensitive 81 to the debt ratio. This suggests that the impact of lower loans 82 on the budget of debtor countries was accommodated through 83 the transfers of other resources that allowed these countries to 84 avoid a correction of their trade deficits as the debt increased. 85 Official donors substituted grants for loans leaving net trans-86 fers to IDA countries unaffected by their relative indebtedness.
87
Indeed, we find that multilateral and bilateral grants signifi-88 cantly increase with the debt ratio. Conventional grants were 89 provided, in addition to debt relief, to mitigate the impact of 90 lower allocations of loans and to ease the debt adjustment pro-91 cess, a strategy that we define as defensive granting. 92 We also allow the effect of debt on the allocation of net 93 loans, transfers, and grants to be different in the case of HIPC 94 and nonHIPC countries by dividing our sample into a group 95 of 40 HIPC countries and a control group of 35 nonHIPC 96 countries. We still find no evidence of defensive lending but 97
further support for the hypothesis of defensive granting. 98
Although the substitution of grants for loans is an established 99 trend of development assistance, the fact that this substitution 100 is conditional on high levels of debt points to a distortion of 101 aid flows in favor of indebted countries and questions the effi-102 ciency and selectivity of foreign aid. 103
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
301 The budget constraint (6) shows that the debt grows be-302 tween t and t + 1 to a level that is (1 + q) of the level that im-303 plies a Ponzi scheme, and n-periods ahead the debt is (1 + q) n 304 the size of a Ponzi scheme. If q < 0 and Z t is a bounded sto-305 chastic process, then E t u tþn B tþn ¼ ð1 þ qÞ n B t þ P n i¼1 ð1 þ qÞ nÀi 306 E t V iÀ1 ! 0 as n ! 1, where u t+n is the marginal rate of sub-307 stitution between consumption in period t and t + n, and 308 E t V iÀ1 is the present value of the process bZ t discounted using 309 u t+i . The idea we want to explore is that intertemporal debt sus-375 tainability was achieved through a substitution of grants for 376 loans that allowed for a looser policy adjustment. The absence 377 of a reaction of net transfers to the debt ratio (or a positive 378 one) would indicate that highly indebted countries could avoid 379 a correction of their trade deficits, as the debt increased, be-380 cause of aid. The hypothesis of "unreactive transfers" k P 0, 381 can be tested by estimating Eqn. (7). 382
An alternative approach to Eqn. (7) is to study how the debt 383 ratio affected the allocation of grants by estimating the follow-384 ing equation: 385
The finding of a positive effect of the debt ratio on grants, that 389 is, l > 0, after controlling for other country characteristics, Z t , 390 would point to a distortion of aid flows in favor of indebted 391 countries in order to ease their debt reduction process, a 392 hypothesis that we call defensive granting. Since debt forgive-393 ness was a relevant component of total grants clearly targeted 394 to high-debt countries over the most recent period, the defini-395 tion of grants used in the estimation of Eqns. (7) and (8) Table 6 of the Appendix).
The empirical models are the cross-country panel versions of 412
Eqns. (5), (7) and (8) derived in Section 3. Using the subscript i 413 to index IDA country recipients and t to index time, the 414 estimated models are
417 417 418 where L it , NT it and G it denote net loans, net transfers, and 419 grants, respectively, which are all measured relative to GDP. 420 B it is the external debt-to-GDP ratio, and Z it is a set of explan-421 atory variables capturing the other determinants of resource 422 allocation. Finally, a i are country-specific fixed effects, s t are 423 yearly time dummies, and e J it denote the error terms. 437 We consider all types of loans, either concessional or non-438 concessional, provided by multilateral and bilateral creditors, 439 since this is the relevant aggregate for the debt sustainability 440 analysis proposed in the previous section. As our dependent 441 variable includes nonconcessional loans, the present study 442 does not provide a formal analysis of aid allocation but natu-443 rally complements the empirical literature on aid. Data on 444 loans come from the World Bank GDF database which re-445 ports total loans unlike the OECD Development Assistance 446 Committee (DAC) that considers only ODA concessional 447 loans. Since GDF data on bilateral loans are not disaggregat-448 ed by country of origin, we restrict our analysis to two groups 449 of creditors-donors: multilateral organizations and bilateral 450 creditors. We examine long-term net loans (and long-term 451 debt) because data on the distribution by type of creditor 452 are not available for short-term loans (and debt) which are, 453 however, a minor component of total loans. 454 The dependent variable "grants," G it , is defined as total 455 grants minus technical cooperation and total debt forgiven. 456 Data on grants come from the OECD/DAC database (where 457 debt forgiven is classified as grant) and are disaggregated by 458 the type of donor: multilateral and bilateral donors. We ex-459 clude debt forgiven for two reasons. First, forgiven debt is al-460 ready accounted for in our definition of net loans, since it leads 461 to lower debt service payments in the GDF statistics (which do 462 not include an offsetting entry for debt relief as in the OECD/ 463 DAC statistics). Secondly, as already discussed in Section 3, 464 we are interested in the effect of debt on grants in addition 465 to that on debt forgiveness. We also exclude technical cooper-466 ation from total grants because it is the least fungible form of 467 aid and thus unlikely to free budget resources for debt service. are from the GDF database and refer to long-term debt. 483
Recalling that a negative reaction of net loans to the debt ra-484 tio, q < 0, is a sufficient condition for a sustainable (no-Ponzi) 485 debt strategy, the hypothesis of defensive lending can be tested 486 as q P 0. A nonnegative effect of the debt ratio on net transfers, 487 k P 0, would indicate that, because of the transfers received, 488
IDA countries could avoid a correction of their trade deficits 489 as the debt increased. The hypothesis of "unreactive transfers" 490 can be tested as k P 0. Finally, the reaction of grants to the debt 491 ratio, l, provides further insight in the policy of official donors. 492
Evidence of a positive effect of the debt ratio, l > 0, would sug-493 gest that conventional grants (on top of debt relief) were given to 494 ease the debt reduction process in highly indebted countries, a 495 strategy that we have defined defensive granting. 496
We shall also estimate extended specifications of Eqns. (9) 554 The basic models derived in Section 3 do not account for the 555 fact that aid is typically planned in the context of multiyear 556 plans and is disbursed into a number of installments over time. 557 In fact, simple inspection reveals the presence of a significant 558 autocorrelation in our dependent variables. Then, to account 559 for the persistent nature of net loans, net transfers and grants, 560 we also estimate a dynamic specification of models (9)- (11) by 561 including the first lag of the dependent variable among the 562 regressors. The dynamic models allow us to correctly estimate 563 the effect of the debt-to-GDP ratio; that is, to avoid the omit-564 ted variable bias that would arise from the exclusion of the 565 lagged dependent variables. 13 
566
We use a fixed-effects GLS estimator in order to correct for 567 heteroskedasticity across countries and obtain efficient esti-568 mates. A groupwise likelihood ratio heteroskedasticity test, 569 performed on the residuals of the baseline model estimated 570 by OLS, led to a rejection of the null hypothesis of homoske-571 dasticity across groups (countries) for all regressions. We also 572 tested for serial correlation of the error terms within groups 573 using the LM test suggested by Baltagi and Li (1995) . Under 574 two alternative assumptions for the error autocorrelation 575 structure (i.e., an AR(1) and a MA(1)) the null hypothesis of 576 no serial correlation in the disturbance is rejected in one equa-577 tion out of four. Since the size of the autocorrelation coeffi-578 cient is negligible for all equations, we decided not to correct 579 for serial correlation and to adopt a feasible fixed-effects 580 GLS estimator, incorporating only heteroskedasticity across 581 countries. 582 In a dynamic panel with country fixed effects the lagged 583 dependent variable is correlated with the country-specific com-584 ponent of the error term and, thus, the GLS fixed-effects esti-585 mator produces biased estimates. However, Nickell (1981) 586 shows that, in the AR(1) case, the bias declines as the time ser-587 ies dimension of the panel, T, increases. Judson and Owen 588 (1999) test the performance of the fixed-effects estimator by 589 means of Monte Carlo simulations, concentrating on panels 590 with typical macroeconomic dimensions, that is, small N and 591 T. Their analysis suggests that the fixed-effects estimator per-592 forms well when T = 30. As in our sample T = 27, we expect 593 any bias introduced by the inclusion of the lagged dependent 594 variable to be small. However, we also provide estimates using 595 the difference GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and 596 Bond (1991), treating the debt-to-GDP ratio and the other 597 regressors as predetermined variables. The Arellano and Bond 598 estimator uses the lags of the levels of the endogenous and pre-599 determined variables as instruments, and is preferable, in our 600 case, to system GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998) , since net 601 loans, net transfers, and grants are not strongly autocorrelat-602 ed, that is, they are far from random walks, which implies that 603 the lagged levels are good instruments for the first-differenced 604 variables. In particular, the set of instruments includes six suit-605 able lags of the dependent variable and the predetermined 606 variables; that is, from lag t À 2 to t À 7 of L t (or NT t , G t ), 607 and from lag t À 1 to t À 6 of B t and Z t . We limit the number 608 of lags used as instruments to avoid the weak-instrument 609 problem that arises because of the excessive number of instru-610 ments in our sample where T = 27 (see, e.g., Roodman, 2009 To gain further insight in the lenders' decision, we decom-650 pose the stock of debt into the shares held by multilateral, 651 bilateral, and private creditors and enter the three debt ratios 652 in the dynamic regression separately. The results of this inves-653 tigation are reported in columns 5-6 and 9-10 for the GLS 654 and GMM estimations, respectively. Interestingly, each credi-655 tor group reacts more strongly to the debt share it holds than 656 to the share of debt held by the other group. This finding is 657 consistent with the creditors' aim to reduce loans where they 658 were more exposed which is clear evidence against the defen-659 sive lending hypothesis. 660
While multilateral and bilateral creditors show the same 661 reaction to the debt ratio, only the former takes into ac-662 count the policy performance of recipient countries, as mea-663 sured by the CPIA index. The greater selectivity of 664 multilateral organizations in deciding on loan allocation is 665
shown by the positive coefficient on the CPIA index that 666 is significant at the 1% level in all regressions. By contrast, 667 a higher CPIA score lowers net loans from bilateral credi-668 tors, though such effect is not significant in GMM estima-669 tion. On the other hand, real GDP per capita at PPP, 670 and thus relative poverty, does not appear to play a role 671 in loan allocation, nor does GDP growth, which is perhaps 672 surprising in the case of multilateral organizations. Finally, 673
IDA countries with large populations receive more loans 674 from multilateral creditors.
(b) Multilateral and bilateral net transfers

676
Having provided evidence of a systematic negative reaction 677 of net loans to debt, it is interesting to investigate whether this 678 reaction forced debtor countries to correct trade deficits (and 679 attract foreign direct investment) or lower loans were accom-680 modated through the transfers of other resources. Evidence 681 on the allocation of net transfers is reported in Table 2 for 682 the static model of Eqn. (10) in columns 1 and 2, and for its 683 dynamic version in the columns that follow. 684 The static model estimation shows that net transfers pro-685 vided by either multilateral or bilateral donors increased with 686 the debt ratio. However, the positive and significant coefficient 687 on the debt ratio in the static specification is likely due to an 688 omitted variable problem, as the first lag of net transfers is 689 highly significant when it is added to the regressions in columns 690 3 and 4. After controlling for their persistence, net transfers dis-691 play no reaction to the debt ratio, either in the GLS or GMM 692 estimations reported in columns 3-4 and 7-8, respectively. In 693 all cases, it appears that the resources provided by multilateral 694 and bilateral creditor-donors allowed IDA countries to avoid a 695 reduction of the trade deficit as the debt increased. Indeed, the 696 hypothesis of "unreactive transfers," that k P 0, cannot be re-697 jected at any reasonable significance level. 
(c) Multilateral and bilateral grants
733
The relation between grants and debt may shed light on 734 whether grants were given to IDA countries to ease their debt 735 adjustment process. coefficient is significant at the 1% level in all regressions (see 743 columns 2, 4 and 6). In the case of multilateral donors, the 744 debt ratio significantly increases grants at the 1% level in 745 GLS estimates while it is not significant in GMM estimates, 746 though with a p-value of 15%, (see column 7). The mixed re-747 sults for multilateral grants can however be explained by look-748 ing at the regressions in columns 5 and 9 where the debt shares 749 held by multilateral, bilateral, and private creditors are entered 750 separately. Both GLS and GMM estimations show that mul-751 tilateral debt was a main determinant of multilateral grants, as 752 opposed to bilateral debt and, to a lesser extent, private debt. 753
When this result is matched with previous evidence of a nega-754 tive reaction of multilateral loans to multilateral debt (see col-755 umns 5 and 9 in Table 1 ), it lends further support to the 756 conjecture that grants were substituted for loans as a part of 757 the exit strategy of multilateral organizations from IDA coun-758
tries' debt problems. Finally, columns 6 and 10 show that 759 bilateral donors also provided more grants to countries with 760 high multilateral debt, a finding that likely reflects their greater 761 involvement in debt relief initiatives until the mid-2000s. 762
While indebtedness was a main determinant of grant alloca-763 tion, official donors were not insensitive to recipients' needs. 764
Poverty and low growth also played a significant role in do-765 nors' decisions. The coefficient on real GDP per capita is in-766 deed negative and significant in all but one regression for 767 bilateral grants. Multilateral donors also provided more 768 grants to dampen the impact of cyclical downturns, and a sim-769 ilar behavior is observed for bilateral donors but only in 770 GMM estimation. The intervention of official donors in low-771 growth environments is evidence of the importance of recipi-772 ents' needs in their aid policy. On the other hand, the policy 773 performance of IDA countries, as measured by the CPIA in-774 dex, does not seem to be a relevant factor in grant allocation 775 even in the case of multilateral donors, contrary to what pre-776 viously found for net loans and net transfers. 777
The finding of a significant positive relation between debt 778 and conventional grants, after controlling for poverty and 779 cyclical indicators, points to a distortion of aid flows in favor 780 of indebted countries. It suggests that grants were provided to 781 offset the contemporaneous reduction in net loans so as to ease 782 the debt adjustment process of high debt countries, a strategy 783 that we have called defensive granting.
(d) HIPC versus nonHIPC countries
785
If official creditors aimed at reducing their exposure to de-786 fault risk, the reaction of net loans to the debt ratio could 787 be stronger at higher levels of debt. Intertemporal sustainabil-788 ity can indeed be ensured by a nonlinear reaction that is 789 strictly negative above a certain threshold debt ratio (Bohn, 790 1998) . To capture possible nonlinearities, we distinguish be-791 tween HIPC and nonHIPC countries rather than focusing 792 on given thresholds of the debt ratio, which would be arbitrary 793 and vary across countries depending on the quality of their 794 policies and institutions (Kraay & Nehru, 2006 ). 795
The condition of being a HIPC country is a relevant proxy 796 for having a high level of debt since a debt ratio exceeding a 797
given threshold is needed to qualify for the HIPC Initiative, 798 while the condition of being eligible for IDA borrowing is nat-799 urally satisfied in our sample. Hence, to investigate whether a 800 high debt ratio changes the allocation of net loans, net trans-801 fers, and grants, we allow the effect of debt on donors' deci-802 sions to be different in the case of HIPC and nonHIPC 803 countries. We do so by interacting the debt ratio with two 804 dummies; a dummy H i , taking the value of one in the case 805 of a HIPC country and a dummy NH i taking the value of 806 one in the case of a nonHIPC country. Then, we estimate 807 the following dynamic panel models: 808
811 The coefficients on the interacted debt ratios allow us to 812 examine whether the effect of the debt ratio on net loans, 813 net transfers, and grants differs between HIPC and non-814 HIPC countries. 815 The fixed-effects GLS estimates are shown in Table 4 , and 816 they are robust to a GMM estimation which is reported in 817 Table 8 of the Appendix. Columns 1-6 present results for 818 the total debt ratio, while columns 7-12 for the decomposition 819 of the debt ratio in the shares held by multilateral, bilateral, 820 and private creditors. 16 
821
Evidence of a different effect of the debt ratio on resource 822 allocation across HIPC and nonHIPC countries is striking.
823 At low levels of debt, as in the case of nonHIPC countries, 824 the debt ratio plays no role in the creditor-donors' decisions 825 on allocating either net loans or grants. The debt ratio signif-826 icantly affects only bilateral net transfers but with a negative 827 sign (see columns 2-6). By contrast, at high levels of debt, that 828 is for HIPC countries, the reaction of net loans to the debt ra-829 tio is negative while grants increase. Such effects are significant 830 at the 1% level both in the case of multilateral and bilateral 831 creditor-donors. The combined effects of the debt ratio on 832 grants and net loans leave bilateral net transfers unaffected 833 and even raise multilateral net transfers, though at the 10% 834 significance level. 835 Evidence on net loans is consistent with a significant nonlin-836 earity in the response of official creditors to the debt ratio; a 837 negative reaction emerges only at high levels of debt. The find-838 ing that official creditors reduced their exposure to the high 839 debts of HIPC countries, while they took no action in the case 840 of sustainable nonHIPC debt, is further evidence against 841 defensive lending. On the other hand, both groups of donors 842 provided more grants to HIPC countries as their debt in-843 creased. This was possibly to ease the debt adjustment process 844 (on top of debt relief) that would have otherwise required a 845 correction of their trade deficits or more foreign direct invest-846 ments. These findings lend further support to the hypothesis of 847 defensive granting, that grants were used in place of loans to 848 solve the HIPC debt problem. 849 While multilateral and bilateral institutions have a similar 850 reaction to total debt, columns 7 and 8 show that debt own-851 ership is another important determinant of their lending 852 decisions. While multilateral creditors reduced their loans 853 to HIPC countries independently of whether they or bilat-854 eral creditors held the debt, bilateral creditors only reacted 855 to their own share of debt. The concern of official creditors 856 for their own exposure is also evident in the negative reac-857 tion to their own share of nonHIPC debt. In fact, bilateral 858 creditors reduced net loans as their debt share increased, 859 without distinguishing between HIPC and nonHIPC coun-860 tries, while multilateral lenders' reaction to their share of 861 debt was even stronger in the case of nonHIPC countries. 862 The fact that official creditors reduced net loans to countries 863 where they were more exposed is inconsistent with a defen-864 sive lending strategy.
865
The effect of debt ownership on grant allocation is shown 866 in columns 11 and 12. Multilateral and bilateral grants sig-867 nificantly increase with the debt ratio in the case of HIPC 868 countries while the debt has no effect in nonHIPC countries 869 (except when it is owed to private creditors The impact of lower loans on the budget of debtor countries 046 was however accommodated through the transfers of other re-047 sources, in the form of conventional grants, on top of debt for-048
giveness. The resources provided by multilateral and bilateral 049 donors allowed IDA countries to avoid a correction of their Notes: Ratios to GDP are obtained using current GDP in US dollars from WDI (World Bank). 
